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TOP GROWING CKCART

BYE-35025-65 Copy No. _____

29 November 1965

MENCRANDUM

SUBJECT: Political Problems Involved in Operating CECART Missions from Okinawa over Communist China and North Vietnam

Communist Reactions

hnowledge of the operation. Mission aircraft would almost certainly be detected by Chinese radar and,

be identified as a new type of recommaissance vehicle. The chances are good that Chinese agents on Okinawa would become aware of the operation and that Peiping would quickly relate the new overflights to the base at Kadena.

2. The Chinese would of course try to knock down the aircraft. Assuming their failure to do so, and a successful flight, we believe the chances of significantly adverse consequences to the US are virtually negligible. For the reasons that they do not acknowledge successful U-2 overflights, they would almost certainly

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: AUG 2007

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not	draw	any	special	attention	to	this	operation.	

- 3. The situation would be quite different, of course, if an OKCART aircraft came down on Chinese territory. Such an incident would be the occasion for a major political and propaganda campaign, particularly if a live American pilot fell into Chinese hands. In dramatizing the affair, Peiping would hope to persuade the world, including the American public, of Chinese strength and of the riskiness of US policy. They would also use what resources they had to mobilize public opinion in Japan and in Okinewa against US control of the latter island and against the existence of US bases in Japan itself.
- 4. We do not believe that CXCART missions, whether or not any missions aircraft came down inside China, would significantly affect Peiping's broader calculations governing its policy toward the war in Vietnam.
- 5. North Vietnam. The DRV is already subjected to heavy US air attack and reconnaissance. It would attach little extra significance to the CXCART operation.

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6. The USER.	
the Soviets would quickly acquire a fairly complete picture o	f the
operation. They would probably take no action and make no	
representations on the matter. Moscow would reinforce any Ch	inese
or North Vietnamese propaganda campaigns built around the sho	ot-
down of an aircraft. But almost certainly they would not make	0
overflights of China or the DRV a major issue in Soviet-US re	lations
Their primary concern would be to forestell use of the aircra	ft
over their own territory. To this end they would probably is	ans.
propaganda recalling the inglorious and of the U-2 program over	er
the USSR, and warming of the dangers of retribution against	
cooperating countries. They might further make private commu	alcs-
tions to the US stressing the seriousness with which they would	ld
view any intrusions into Soviet airspace.	
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